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Do Global Credit Rating Agencies Think Globally? 





Credit rating agencies are an integral part of modern capital markets. Their 
assessments on sovereign and corporate entities have been increasingly used as 
benchmarks by regulators and investors.
1  The rating industry counts only three major 
world players—Moody’s, S&P, Fitch-IBCA, all originated in the USA—that have 
become global following the dramatic growth of international financial markets.
2 But do 
these global rating agencies really think globally? In other words, do they convey to 
markets high-quality information on borrowers in both developed and emerging 
economies? 
This question has become pertinent after the harsh criticism of rating agencies 
following the East Asian financial crises. Besides, their expected world-wide influence 
will certainly be further expanded by the new Basel criteria linking bank capital asset 
requirements to corporate and sovereign ratings (Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision, 2001). Indeed, in the course of the recent financial crises, rating agencies 
have been criticised for their pro-cyclical rating behaviour, which may have exacerbated 
the massive capital outflows from crisis countries. Given the considerable influence 
rating agencies exert on financial markets, their rating behaviour and methodologies have 
also come under close scrutiny.
3 Studies on rating agencies’ sovereign rating assignment 
have been extensive.
4 However, our understanding  has so far been  limited as to how 
credit rating agencies rate firms  differently around the world. Specifically, cursory 
evidence  and some research findings underline that  rating criteria  used for  firms in 
developing countries differ with respect to those reserved to firms in developed countries.  
Indeed, this has become a critical issue as a tight linkage between sovereign and 
firm ratings seem to hold for developing countries but not for developed ones (Ferri, Liu, 
and Majnoni, 2001). Specifically, whenever developing countries suffer a sovereign 
downgrading, firms’ ratings in those countries will also be adversely affected: The 
correlation is large, close to 0.7 for industrial firms in developing countries, whereas it is 
negligible for firms in developed countries. Such rating behaviour is likely to put firms in 
developing countries in a rather disadvantaged position whenever their sovereign 
experiences a downgrading and/or during an economic downturn.
5 Such distinct rating 
                                                             
1 For example, this happens for institutional investors who are generally bound by securities regulations 
prescribing that they only invest in assets that are rated above the investment grade. 
2 See White (2001) for a critical assessment of the degree of competition and contestability in the credit 
rating industry. 
3 IMF (1999), for example, provides a comprehensive discussion of the problems faced in assigning ratings 
in developing countries and the analytical methodology used by credit rating agencies during recent crises. 
4 Among others, see Ferri, Liu, and Stiglitz (1999) and Monfort and Mulder (2000) for recent assessments 
and Cantor and Packer (1994, 1996) for early analyses of rating agencies’ behavior on sovereign ratings. 
5 Although Ederington, Yawitz and Roberts (1987) show that market yields on bonds do reflect publicly 
available financial statistics on issuers, besides the ratings of the issue, this evidence is hardly relevant to 
our context. Indeed, their data refer to the US and do not reflect the information asymmetry of LDCs.   3
pattern naturally raises questions. Specifically, how do rating agencies distinguish credit 
risks vs. their corresponding sovereign risks for firms in developing countries? 
This p aper addresses  such a  question. Specifically, the paper  examines  the 
contribution of firm-level information in each individual firm’s rating assignment, in 
addition to its corresponding sovereign rating. The revealed importance of firm -specific 
information as measured in weights is compared with that of the firm’s sovereign ratings. 
Furthermore, the causes of the difference between developed and developing countries 
are carefully scrutinised. The paper also investigates the relationship between the level of 
information disclosure and the importance of firm level information in the assignment of 
firm ratings. In all, we assess and compare the ability of rating agencies to reduce 
information asymmetry under different market environments. 
To carry out our examination, we ventured to build a large data-base accurately 
matching  around the world  sovereign ratings, individual firms’ ratings and  those 
individual firms’ risk indicators that rating agencies reportedly use in rating assignments. 
The data-base covers three years: 1997, 1998 and 1999, a relatively homogeneous period 
as to regimes of international mobility of capital. We also complement our data-base with 
the widely used law and finance indicators proposed by  La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, 
Shleifer and Vishny (1998) as well as with the information quality indicator recently 
proposed by Chan-Lee (2001). On this, we have some a priori. First, comparably  less 
public information  on individual firms  may be available  in countries endowed with 
underdeveloped financial markets that are therefore more opaque.  Second,  any  time 
rating agencies  disclose  additional information on  individual firms’  risks, such action 
should have more value the more opaque is the market. Third,  rating agencies’ ability 
may, however, be inversely related to the degree of countries’ financial market 
opaqueness. 
We reach three main findings. First, we show that sovereign risks’ contribution to 
firms’ ratings is much larger in developing vis-à-vis developed countries. Second, even 
controlling for the “country ceiling effect”—private ratings are bound not to exceed their 
sovereign rating—firms’ idiosyncratic information is largely irrelevant in developing 
countries. Thus, the information content of developing countries’ firm ratings is much 
smaller than in developed countries. Third, we find that cross-country indicators of 
information quality, rule of law etc. help explain this unsatisfactory situation but do not 
solve the puzzle entirely. 
We proceed by first discussing rating methodologies of major international rating 
agencies (Section II). Their track record in providing information to investors in their 
assessing sovereign and firm risks in developed and developing countries is then 
considered. The core of the issues raised in this paper and methodology of econometric 
estimation are discussed in Section III. Section IV presents the data used for the empirical 
estimation. The information content of firm-level ratings—i.e., idiosyncratic risk vs. 
country risk—is empirically examined in Section V. Section VI concludes and discusses 
policy implications. 
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II. Rating Methodology of Global Credit Rating Agencies 
II.1 The General Principles 
Possibly under mounting pressure from  market participants,  international 
institutions, and academia, global credit ratings agencies (GCRAs) have recently started 
to publish their ratings criteria. These publications help one to gauge GCRAs’ rating 
philosophy and methodologies on various issue types and issuer ratings. A firm’s desire 
to obtain a credit rating is often motivated by its need to issue liabilities in capital 
markets. Information asymmetry vis-à-vis investors is perhaps the major obstacle to the 
firm’s endeavour. The firm has to seek a rating from an independent credit rating agency 
to reduce its information asymmetry. Thus, banks and institutional investors usually rely 
on external ratings as a yardstick for the borrower’s credit and default risks. To be sure, a 
firm incorporated outside the US, the EU, and Japan and attempting to raise funds there 
de facto needs to preliminarily obtain a rating from a GRCA.
6 
The process to obtain a credit rating on a particular issue usually starts with a 
request from the firm who has expressed an interest in securing a rating before a bond 
issuance.
7  After signing a letter of rating agreement, a series of meetings between the 
issuer and the rating agency ensues. Analysts and corporate financial officers then 
exchange relevant queries, views and information. The time needed to assign the rating 
usually is about 6 to 12 weeks (S&P, 1998), that can be reduced in case of urgent market 
need or if the firm is forthcoming with information disclosure and/or  its  financial 
statements are highly accurate. Fees charged on the issuer vary with the nature of issues 
or issuers and time to assign the rating. GRCAs will ensure confidentiality if sensitive 
information of the firm is provided. In this sense, since rating agencies have access to 
information out of reach  for other market participants, ratings should better reflect the 
firm’s ability to honour its debt obligations. Nevertheless, commonly, rating assignments 
are mainly based on publicly available information.
8 
Table 1 summarises rating criteria published by S&P and Moody’s. Criteria 
encompass both qualitative and quantitative indicators. In general, a firm’s growth 
potential, its capital requirements, the degree of competition in its market and industry, its 
productive diversification and ownership structure are included as business risks. For 
example, management quality is judged an important element in determining a firm’s 
ability to honour its debt obligations; but it is also difficult to quantify. It will be up to the 
analysts to evaluate by probing managers about their risk profiles, strategies and 
management philosophy. Subjective judgements often play an important role in this part 
of the rating process. However, a firm’s financial performance track record can be a 
reliable proxy of management quality. Analysts also evaluate other qualitative 
information. 
                                                             
6 This is true even though rating fees charged by GCRAs are in general higher than at domestic or local 
credit rating agencies.  
7 To be sure, recently issuers have been requesting credit ratings also for other purposes, even in the 
absence of current bond issuance. The sophistication and innovation of financial products postulates 
increased use of such issuer ratings. In addition, in some cases, rating agencies elaborate “unsolicited” 
ratings, to be disclosed to the public only in case the interested party has no objection. 
8 Reliability and accuracy of publicly available information depends on the level of information disclosure. 
As discussed below, this is a problem for firms in LDCs.    5
Obviously, a firm’s ability to honour its debt can be best assessed from its income 
statements, balance sheets, and financial performance ratios.  This  quantitative 
information includes a set of indicators likely determining the issuer’s ability to generate 
future income. Perhaps the most important ratio is whether the firm can generate cash to 
meet its debt repayment (Moody’s, 2000).  Usually, the cash flow adequacy ratio is 
measured by the firm’s coverage on its interest rate obligations. The second  most 
important financial indicator is whether a firm has overly extended itself, as measured by 
its debt leverage, often reflecting the firm’s capital structure and assets protection. The 
third most important class of indicators refers to profitability and efficiency. The firm’s 
returns on equity, on assets, or on permanent capital are often used to this purpose. These 
indicators can also help to track the  firm’s management quality. Finally, other financial 
risks—e.g. the firm’s resilience to business cycles and its financial flexibility in a stress 
scenario—are also considered. These stress tests, however, are not based on true forecasts 
of the firm’s future performance but on its past performance as revealed by its 3 to 5 year 
financial statements. 
Although financial statements and ratios cannot fully represent the firm’s ability 
to service debt, GCRAs systematically compare their ratings with firms’ financial ratios. 
Table 2 relates rating categories to firms’ financial indicators pertinent to cash flow, 
capital structure, profitability, and financial flexibility for a group of 967 US-based firms. 
Several distinct features stand out prominently. First, the higher the firm’s rating, the 
higher its interest coverage ratios (EBIT and EBITA interest coverage), as well as its 
funds flow/total debt and free operating cash flows/total debt. Thus, the firm’s cash flow 
and liquidity are very important determinants of its rating. Second, high-rated firms 
generally show superior return on capital and  operating efficiency. Third, and not 
surprisingly, rating levels negatively relate to firms’ leverage ratios, measured by long-
term debt and/or gross total debt. Indeed, as rating grades move below BBB, the “border 
line” between investment grade and speculative grade, financial ratios—especially  
interest coverage, profitability, and leverage ratios—markedly deteriorate. 
The  firm’s g eographical location is a very important determinant of its rating. 
This is critical for firms located in non-OECD areas since country (i.e. sovereign) risks 
are closely related to firm-level risks. To some extent such a relationship is justified by a 
well-observed yet not well documented phenomenon, namely macroeconomic cycles are 
more vicious in Less Developed Countries (LDCs) than in Developed Countries (DCs). 
Firms will directly suffer such macroeconomic shocks, irrespective of their management 
and operations. This is especially true when countries are going through a current account 
cum financial crisis (the “twin crises” of Kaminsky and Reinhart, 1999), or are 
experiencing political and civil strife. This is perhaps why a country-ceiling is normally 
capped on local firms. Such consideration is legitimate particularly in sectors, such 
banking, where the impact of an adverse shock—e.g. a balance of payment shock—is 
inescapable. 
Similarly to those for firms, sovereign rating criteria include both qualitative and 
quantitative aspects.
9 Sovereign ratings not only weigh countries’ tangible ability to 
                                                             
9 See S&P, Moody’s and Cantor and Packer (1994) for a survey of sovereign rating criteria.    6
service debt, but implicitly evaluate their institutional quality, e.g. rule of law, political 
stability, and commitment to carry out rule-based capital market transactions. 
 
II.2 The Unsatisfactory Situation with LDC Firms’ Ratings 
The country ceiling based rating behaviour has unpleasant side effects for firms in 
LDCs. Any sovereign downgrade tends to  trigger also a firm downgrade (Ferri-Liu-
Majnoni, 2001). The impact is asymmetric as average firm downgrades generally follow 
a sovereign downgrading whereas a sovereign upgrading does not necessarily lead to an 
average firm upgrading 
Such unsatisfactory rating behaviour also has serious consequences: First, too 
tight a link between firm and sovereign ratings will make  it difficult  for investors  to 
distinguish country risks vs. idiosyncratic credit risks of firms in emerging markets. As a 
consequence, investors tend to shun all sectors of the country, perhaps one of the reasons 
behind the herding behaviour of international capital flows to developing countries. 
Indeed, rating agencies have also realised that the tight bond between firm and sovereign 
ratings tends to impose constraints on the accurate pricing of risks. 
Second, simply relying on sovereign risks to determine firm ratings, without 
carefully analysing credit risks of firms, can be sometimes misleading, as with the 
defaults of China’s Guangdong International Trust and Invest Company (GITIC) and the 
Hainan Development Bank. Since information disclosure on these firms was poor, 
GCRAs assigned ratings on the assumption that the state was the implicit guarantor. The 
perceived state guarantee allowed the two companies  to  get ratings that were not 
consistent with their financial performance and management quality. 
Third, poor firm-level information disclosure is frequently held the reason for 
using the sovereign rating as the benchmark for corresponding firm ratings. However, the 
role of rating agencies is to process financial information on individual issuers to reduce 
the information asymmetry between them and investors. If GCRAs do not examine 
closely the firm’s performance, one wonders whether they are effectively exercising their 
due diligence before assigning a firm rating. This is crucial also because firms pay to get 
rated. Doubts are  then cast on GCRAs’ efficacy in reducing information asymmetry in 
emerging markets. 
Fourth, current regulatory changes will further empower credit ratings. Despite 
imperfections in rating behaviour and methodologies especially felt during crisis 
episodes, past experience shows that, under normal circumstances, GCRAs facilitate the 
efficient functioning of capital markets. The new Basel Accord on bank capital 
requirements (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 2001) promotes the role of 
GCRAs’ external ratings. The new Accord modulates capital/asset requirements 
according to whether banks’ counterparts are rated and, when rated, according to the 
level of their ratings. Accordingly, developing countries may suffer two disadvantages. 
First, as ratings are generally low and less widespread in LDCs, capital requirements—
and hence the cost of credit—may increase irrespective of corporate performance. 
Second, if private ratings in LDCs are excessively sensitive to sovereign ratings, the 
impact of sovereign downgrades will be amplified by the new Basel criteria.   7
 
III. Estimation Framework 
We first review the literature before presenting our model specification. Using 
firm performance indicators to predict rating consistency/accuracy is not novel. Studies 
taking this approach have been extensive. It is found that a few financial statistics—e.g. 
interest coverage ratio, profitability, leverage, and asset size—can predict approximately 
two-thirds of ratings (Ederington, 1985). The fact that financial indicators alone cannot 
fully predict ratings is not surprising.
10 Past studies show that credit ratings indeed 
disclose to the market useful information beyond that contained in firms’ financial ratios, 
depending on the timeliness of credit reviews by GCRAs (Ederington, Yawitz, and 
Roberts, 1987). 
Existing studies mostly focus on the accuracy of GCRAs’ ratings. Though 
differentiated by sector, samples in these studies typically include US firms only. Thus 
these studies are unable to address the impact of sovereign risks on individual firm 
ratings. This approach is unsatisfactory when referring to a diversified range of firms 
from different countries and regions. 
 
III 3.a Estimation Model 
We assume that, for profit reasons, a rating agency attempts to capture a firm’s 
risk in its rating assignment as accurately as possible. This is because GCRAs rely on 
their accuracy to predict default and their reputation capital to generate continuous 
business. This motivation can be formalised by minimising the squared distance between 
a firm’s true risk, 
t
it R   and its assigned firm rating, 
f
it R .  The rating agency’s utility 
function can modelled as follows: 




it it R R U - - =  
Where 
t
it R  consists of two components: one related to the firm’s idiosyncratic 
risks (or credit risk) and the other related to the overall macroeconomic risk, as captured 
by the sovereign risk, 
s
it R . The subscript i represents firms and t represents the sample’s 
time horizon. Hence, 
t
it R  can then be formulated as follows: 






it R R R b a + =  
Where 
c
it R  is the firm’s idiosyncratic risk and 
s
it R is the aggregate risk of the 
country where the firm is located. For the sake of simplicity, we assume that the 
                                                             
10 For example, Ederington (1985) shows that an unordered logit model performs better than linear, ordered 
probits, and linear discriminant ones. Resti and Omachi (2001) using a logit model demonstrates that 
unexplained discordant pairs are large enough that one cannot totally rely on financial indicators alone to 
predict ratings since credit rating analysts do use their subjective judgment in assigning ratings. Similar 
studies, looking at Moody’s banking sector strength ratings, like Laruccia and Revoltella (2000) and Poon, 
Firth, and Fung (1999) also validate the financial indicator a pproach in predicting rating 
consistency/accuracy: Though from a different angle, their evidence implies that credit ratings possess 
more information than financial indicators alone.   8
aggregate country risk can be fully captured by the sovereign rating. Based on the 
previous section, we know that both qualitative and quantitative indicators are used to 
determine firm ratings. Although qualitative indicators are hard to assess, they are also 
important. The quantitative indicators are basically derived from firms’ balance sheet 
data, usually related to cash flows, profitability, leverage ratios, and asset size. 
c
it R  can be 
further decomposed as follows: 






it R R R h h - + =   
Where 
q
it R  and 
l
it R  summarise quantitative a nd qualitative rating criteria, 
respectively. Thus, the rating agency’s detailed utility function becomes: 
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Maximising with respect to the rating agency’s rating, 
f
it R , we have following 
first order condition: 
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In order for us to interpret the results in terms of contribution weights to the 
firm’s rating assignment of each of the three components, i.e., 
q
it R , 
l
it R , and 
s
it R , we then 
normalise the coefficients of these variables by imposing a constraint: b l m - - =1 . 
Finally, we can further rewrite the estimation equation as follows: 








it R R R R b l b l - - + + =  
Other than the firm’s quantifiable rating criteria and sovereign risk ratings, 
l
it R  is 
not observable. Following a procedure similar to that used by Levitt (1996), we can 
rewrite equation (6) using an indicator variable notation:  








it R R R R b l b l - - + + =  
where Iit includes firm specific dummies. 
 
III.b Estimation Approach 
Our optimal aim is to estimate equation (6) in a way to identify the weight of the 
qualitative rating criteria (
l
it R ) and ascertain whether such weight varies across developed 
and developing countries. However, this will put a restrictive requirement on the data. A 
large enough panel data-set is needed for such an analysis because of the loss of degrees 
of freedom directly related to incorporating Iit dummies. As discussed below, we only 
have three-year-averaged cross-sectional data for 543 firms from 46 countries. We 
assume that financial indicators implicitly encompass qualitative indicators about a firm.   9
Thus, predicted ratings using financial performance data of rated firms should contain 
both qualitative and quantitative assessment of rating agencies on rated firms.   
Accordingly, we estimate a revised econometric specification: 
) 8 (    1 1
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where
ql
it R is the estimated firms’ rating, supposed to contain both qualitative and 
quantitative assessment of ratings. 
ql
it
LDC R 1 l and
s
it
LDC R 1 b identify the expected specific 
effects for LDCs. The specific regressors employed are detailed below. 
 
IV. The Data 
Matching firm ratings with corresponding performance indicators was 
painstaking, especially since we assembled a data-set of 547 firms scattered in 46 
countries across the globe. We decided to use the data published by S&P’s credit 
statistics because of its relatively large coverage of firms from emerging economies and 
its overall consistency. We exclude US firms from the sample because of their large 
number and homogeneity. Furthermore, we use only long-term issuer’s ratings, to avoid 
inconsistency arising from different types of issues. We are able to compile a data-set 
consisting of ratings and of a set of average performance indicators for the three years 
1997-99. Table 3 presents the distribution of countries as well as firms by country. 
Almost a quarter of firms are from LDCs. Summary statistics of ratings of the data-set are 
presented in Table 4. The comparison with US firms’ performance presented in Table 1 is 
revealing. For firms rated between A and AAA in our sample, interest coverage ratios as 
measured by EBIT and EBITDA interest coverage are in general lower than for US firms. 
Returns to capital and operating income margin, a measure of firms’ efficiency, are also 
lower than those of US firms, so are the leverage ratios. However, when measured in 
terms of absolute numbers with respect to sales, equity, and assets, our AAA-rated firms 
have a much larger median value than the US firms. This is also true for our AA-rated 
and A-rated firms. This comparison also suggests that US firms are more efficiently run 
than the firms in our sample if using the same set of categories.  This may also be 
attributed to market discipline and competition. A similar pattern also emerges for our B, 
BB, and BBB rated firms.  
Firms from emerging economies are generally rated BBB or below (Table 5). 
This is largely due to the “country ceiling effect”: sovereigns in these countries are also 
rated BBB or below. Compared with other firms in the sample, firms from LDCs are 
more profitable. They are also quite efficiently run as indicated by their operating 
income/sales ratio. Generally, they have a large equity and asset size. Finally, contrary to 
commonly held views, leverage ratios are lower in emerging economies. 
Compared to the US firms presented in Table 2, non-US firms in our sample have 
lower interest rate coverage and operating efficiency. Thus, US firms tend to have higher 
leverage, within rating categories, but with less equity and assets. 
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V. Empirical Results 
V.a Idiosyncratic vs. sovereign risks 
  In the first step of our analysis we estimate firm ratings based exclusively on 
those quantitative performance indicators that rating agencies reportedly use. The 
decision as to which specific indicators to include in the estimating equation depends on 
both our priors and statistical significance. Table 6 presents the statistical relationship 
between actual ratings assigned by a rating agency and a set of financial indicators using 
a step-wise regression. As shown in column I of Table 6, EBITINT, the interest coverage 
ratio, ROC, the return on capital, OPERINC, the ratio of operating income to sales, 
DEBTRATIO, the debt leverage ratio, TOTASSETS, the total assets are all statistically 
significant and also have the expected signs. Specifically, a firm’s liquidity (EBITINT), 
profitability (ROC, OPERINC), size (TOTASSETS) are positively related to ratings, 
whereas, as expected, the debt leverage ratio (DEBTRATIO) is negatively related to firm 
ratings. In addition, as indicated by column II of Table 6, GOVTOWNER, a dummy 
taking value 1 for firms owned by the government, SUBSDIARY, a dummy taking value 
1 for subsidiaries of foreign companies, are also factors affecting a firm’s rating.
11 In 
addition, some of the sector dummies are also important. In practice, the coefficients 
estimated from Column II of Table 6 are used to approximate the firm’s estimated rating, 
which is then used as a proxy to represent the firm’s “true” credit risk. 
  Next, we investigate the determinants of actual firm ratings, assessing the 
contribution of the estimated firm rating along with that of the sovereign rating of the 
country where the firm belongs. Table 7 presents the basic results on the contribution of 
firm and sovereign risks. To facilitate our discussion, we take logs on sovereign and firm 
ratings.
12 Columns in set I present the results using OLS; columns in set II also use OLS 
but adjust for heteroschedaticity;
13 and columns in set III re-run the same equations using 
two stage least squares with instrumental variables. We now discuss our main findings in 
turn. 
Column IIA examines the relationship between a firm’s actual rating and its 
corresponding firm credit risk and sovereign risk. The dependent variable is the average 
firm rating. The explanatory variables are the estimated average firm ratings derived 
(from Table 6) and the average sovereign ratings. Specifically, AVGFRAT1 represents 
estimated average firm ratings; AVGSRAT represents actual sovereign ratings; 
NONOECDFRAT1 is the result of multiplying AVGFRAT1 by NONOECD, a dummy 
taking value 1 for countries that not belonging to the OECD. NONOECDSRAT is the 
result of multiplying AVGSRAT by the NONOECD dummy. The basic idea behind 
inserting these two variables is to ascertain whether AVGFRAT1 and AVGSRAT have a 
different impact for OECD vs. NONOECD firms. 
                                                             
11 LISTED, a dummy taking value 1 for firms listed in the Stock Exchange, didn’t turn out significant. 
12 This implies that the original function form is Cobb-Douglass, i.e. 






it R R R = . As the link 
between firm and sovereign ratings is not theoretically based, we avoid imposing restrictions on l and b. 
13 Using the Breusch-Pagan test, we detect heteroschedaticity. We then use the White (1980) methods to 
adjust for heteroschedaticity.   11
  Indeed, the results of the estimation by OLS are quite revealing. As expected and 
given the dominance of the firms from OECD countries, the message from these results is 
that sovereign risks are not important; while firm credit risks play a major role in 
determining a firm’s actual credit rating. However, if we disentangle t he effects by 
country groups, the impact of firm and sovereign risks in a firm’s rating tends to be 
differentiated. AVGFRAT1 is more important for OECD countries, where its elasticity is 
1.3, indicating that one percentage point change in the credit risk of a firm associates to a 
change of more than 1 percentage point in the actual rating of the firm. The opposite 
holds for NOEOECD countries, where the elasticity is 0.49. Such a contrast is most 
prominent for the effect of the sovereign risk on actual firm  ratings, that is absent for 
OECD firms but is very large for NONOECD firms. For the latter firms, the elasticity of 
NONOECDSRAT is 0.58, implying that one percentage point change in the sovereign 
risk will contribute to about 0.6 percentage point change in the actual firm rating. 
  As discussed above, this strong effect of SOVRAT in LDCs could stem from the 
sovereign ceiling effect. In view of this, we estimated two additional specifications of the 
rating’s determinants equation. First, we dichotomise NONOECDFRAT1 into 
NONOECDFRAT1A—firms whose AVGFRAT1 lies at or above their SOVRAT, 
candidates for a binding sovereign ceiling—and NONOECDFRAT1B, the other firms 
whose AVGFRAT1 lies below their SOVRAT. Regression results are presented in 
column IIB of Table 7. 
  The results show that in this specification the effect of NONOECDFRAT1A is 
smaller (only 0.37 compared with a general effect just above 1) and that of 
NONOECDSOVRATA is even stronger (0.77), while SOVRAT turns out to be 
significant here, albeit with a small coefficient (0.14). 
  The results for the other firm group—whose AVGFRAT1 lies below their  
SOVRAT—are presented in column IIC of Table 7. As expected, the impact of an 
individual firm’s credit risk has a higher contribution (0.56) compared with that in 
column IIB. In addition, the contribution of the sovereign risk to actual ratings tends to be 
higher as well (0.90), implying that sovereign risks are even more important when the 
country ceiling is binding.  
To check that our results are not driven by endogeneity, we re-estimate 
specifications IIB and IIC using two stage least squares with instrumental variables.
14 
Results are reported in columns IIIA, IIIB, and IIIC of Table 7, respectively. Although 
the results presented in IIIA are qualitatively similar t o those in IIA, the size of the 
coefficient changes considerably. The impact of the sovereign effect for developing 
countries increases from the previous 0.58 to the current 0.69 and the impact of firm 
credit effect decreases from the previous 0.49 to the current 0.18. The most notable 
change occurs to IIIB and IIIC when instrumental variables are applied. On one hand, the 
                                                             
14 The instruments employed are GDP per capita, rule of law index, Frankel and Romer (1999) derived 
natural trade as a measure of openness, distance from the equator, and some sector dummies. Except for 
sector dummies, they are all in logs. We also examine the correlation of these instruments with the 
regressors as a way to test the robustness of the instruments. Our results indicate that these instruments are 
highly correlated with the regressors and the rationale for using such variables is in line with the recent 
literature on economic openness and institution quality and economic development such as Hall and Jones 
(1999) and Frankel and Romer (1999).   12
specific coefficient of AVGFRAT1A becomes 1.186 but that of NONOECDFRAT1A 
reaches –1.991, thus rendering negative (-0.81) the contribution of firm risks for non-
OECD countries. On the other hand, the contribution of sovereign risk becomes 
overwhelming. The coefficient increases from the previous 0.76 to the current 2.03. Such 
a result implies that when the country ceiling effect is binding—i.e., the estimated firm 
rating exceeds the actual sovereign rating—the information content of actual firm ratings 
is mainly driven by the sovereign information. Any firm credit risk information has little 
bearing, if at all, to actual firm ratings. The results for firms whose country ceiling is 
actually non binding—i.e., the estimated firm risk is actually lower than its sovereign 
risk—are more or less consistent with IIC. The elasticity of NONEOECDFRAT1B is 
0.21, but is not statistically significant. Similarly, the elasticity for sovereign non-OECD 
countries is above 1, but is not statistically significant, either. Even though the results 
may be sensitive to the instrumental variables used, what they imply is that our 
qualitative results appear robust. 
 
V.b Discussion 
We discussed above the less-than-fully-satisfactory pattern of how rating agencies 
rate firms from developing countries. The fundamental question is why don’t GCRAs 
give to firms’ performance indicators in LDCs a weight comparable to the one  they 
normally use in developed countries? To our knowledge, the theoretical literature hasn’t 
yet provided satisfactory explanations to this specific problem. Nevertheless, based on 
related literature, two possible arguments emerge: one hinges on the industrial structure 
of GCRAs and the other stems from the existence of perverse strategic incentives for 
GCRAs. 
The first argument runs as follows. As it is well known, the rating industry shows 
low or non-existent competition and contestability. Accordingly,  we can assume that 
GCRAs—at least jointly but possibly even on an individual basis—enjoy a non-
negligible market power. Thus, GCRAs may extract rent from rated entities: In spite of 
the little data available—a case of little transparency by agents advocating for maximum 
transparency—White (2001) documents that bond rating is quite profitable. Although, 
this raises a distributive problem it does not question yet the industry efficiency.  
However, their market power might lead GCRAs to indulge into under-investing, which 
would indeed cause inefficiency. If GCRAs, in fact, invest less than the socially optimal 
amount in collecting and processing information on rated entities, the quality of the 
ratings they issue is sub-optimal. The next question is: Why should GCRAs’ under-
investment problem be more acute for LDCs than for DCs? The argument here may go 
along the following lines. Even though exit is precluded by the lack of competition, 
GCRAs’ customers and authorities could use voice to induce GCRAs to invest m ore in 
collecting and processing information on rated entities. But the bulk of their customers—
both rated entities and investors—and the authorities they may listen to (e.g. the SEC) are 
based in developed, not in LDCs. According to this interpretation, it would be plausible 
that the information content of firm ratings in LDCs is lower because GCRAs invest less 
there in collecting and processing idiosyncratic information. More specifically, under-
investment in LDCs might not necessarily be in absolute terms, i.e. less effort per rated 
entity. Rather, it could be in relative terms, i.e. the number of analysts per rated entity   13
could even be higher in LDCs, but not high enough to compensate for the lower 
information quality in these countries. Therefore, even if we were to recognise that the 
quality of information in LDCs is not as good as in DCs, there would still be a question 
as to why GCRAs do not invest enough in LDCs.
15 
The second argument descends from the possibility that there exist perverse 
incentives  within a repeated strategic interaction framework between GCRAs and 
investors. Bernheim (1994) tries to explain why we observe that often the conveying of 
information among parties is governed by conformity, i.e. party A will not necessarily tell 
party B what party A knows or thinks, but rather what party A believes best in order to 
build the reputation she needs with party B. Loury (1994)—through a non-formalised 
paper—and Morris (2001)—using a formal model—apply this reputation approach to 
explain political correctness. Extrapolating from this literature, we propose the following 
explanation for GCRAs’ unsatisfactory rating behaviour in LDCs. Suppose investors in 
developed countries are somewhat negatively prejudiced with respect to the performance 
prospects of firms in LDCs. If the rating agency were to issue a strong positive signal on 
an LDC firm by granting it a rating above its sovereign, it would indeed be a powerful 
indication for investors. However, if the rating agency cares maintaining a reputation of 
being conservative, it may have insufficient incentives to grant such a rating. The rating 
agency, in fact, cannot be 100 per cent sure that the LDC firm will actually outperform. 
Something could always happen and it is not optimal for the rating agency to take the risk 
of loosing its reputation. Accordingly, although often the rating agency knows that the 
rated LDC firm is very good, it will have the incentive to conform the issued rating to the 
negative prejudice held by investors in developed countries. 
 
V.c Information quality and firm rating quality across countries 
  In essence, what we argued hitherto can be summarised as follows: Due to the 
spontaneous evolution of financial markets and to regulation, rating agencies are 
becoming more important on a global scale. In spite of the drop in the cost of acquiring 
information, owing to technological progress, the role of GCRAs is thus becoming even 
more fundamental for the working of world financial markets. Based on previous papers 
and on additional arguments, we have questioned the ability of GCRAs to provide 
investors with adequate guidance as to the specific risks of individual firms in LDCs. Our 
suspicion is that GCRAs do not (yet) adequately de-couple individual firm ratings and 
sovereign ratings in these countries. 
Nevertheless, we know that information quality and reliability varies widely 
across countries. Then, does the smaller information content in firm ratings in LDCs 
simply reflect the fact that information quality is poorer in these countries? The key 
difference between emerging and mature capital markets concerns information disclosure 
and its enforcement, often descending from the enforcement of the rule of law. If rating 
agencies cannot trust the information published by firms in LDCs, they may tend to rely 
on benchmark information such as sovereign and macroeconomic information—which is 
compiled in a consistent framework and published by international organisations (e.g. the 
                                                             
15 For example, Ferri (2001) shows that, ceteris paribus, firm ratings in non-OECD countries (but not in 
OECD ones) tend to increase when more analysts are employed on rated firms.   14
IMF). Thus GCRAs might hold sovereign information reliable than firm level data, this 
explaining why the sovereign contribution in firm ratings is substantial for firms from 
LDCs. Our hypothesis to test here is that the rating pattern can be explained by the 
quality of institutions and information of the home country where firms belong. 
Table 8 presents the relationship between institutional quality and the “tightness” 
between firm and sovereign ratings, the latter being measured by the standard deviation 
between a firm’s actual rating and its corresponding sovereign rating (STDEVACT). As 
observed before, contrary to developed countries, for LDCs, the two ratings are closely 
bonded together. Thus, the standard deviation between the firm and sovereign ratings 
tends to be much smaller in developing countries than in developed ones. The second 
“tightness” measure between the firm and sovereign ratings we use is the ratio of the 
standard deviation between the two ratings and the level of the sovereign rating 
(STDEVSORAT). Indeed, both measures of the closeness between the firm and 
sovereign risks can be well explained by the rule of law index developed by the 
Transparency International (2000) and the information quality index recently developed 
by Chan-Lee (2001). 
The results indicate that the higher is the rule of law index,  the higher the 
dispersion between the firm and sovereign ratings. Such a relationship is statistically 
significant. However, for non-OECD country firms there is a negative and statistically 
significant relationship between the rule of law or information quality index and the 
dispersion between the firm rating and sovereign ratings. On one hand, this may imply 
that institutional quality matters as well when firm ratings are concerned. On the other 
hand, this result is telling us that the poorer information quality is not the whole story 
accounting for the smaller information content of firm ratings in emerging economies. 
 
VI. Conclusions and Policy Implications 
  This paper has shed light on the puzzling observation that firm and sovereign 
ratings patterns widely differ in developed vs. developing countries. The starting point 
was observing that the close relationship between firm and sovereign ratings in 
developing countries is non-existent in developed countries. This naturally leads one to 
question the importance of information contents in the firm rating assignment. Our results 
indicated, not surprisingly, that in developed countries individual firm credit risks 
represent almost all the information contents of firm ratings. However, for firms in 
developing countries, the bulk of the rating content rests with their sovereign risks only, 
while individual firms’ credit risks play a negligent role. Examining then the rationale 
behind such a pattern, we found that the quality of institution and the quality of 
information disclosure can partly explain this rating behaviour, but do not totally solve 
the puzzle of firm ratings assignment by GCRAs in emerging economies. 
  Our results have important policy implications: First, we demonstrated that firms 
in LDCs tend to be penalised because of their domicile, regardless of profitability and 
performance. Thus, low private ratings because of low sovereign ratings tend to bring 
about high costs of capital in LDCs. Second, for LDC firms to obtain favourable ratings, 
it is imperative to improve their information disclosure and quality. In fact, this entails 
the strengthening of the rule of law and information quality. As recent literature on   15
growth and institution demonstrates, enhancement of institutional quality can  cause 
economic growth (Hall and Jones, 1999). Similarly, such improvement of institution also 
has a positive impact on the cost of capital, which will be epitomised in the rating 
information for firms from developing countries. At the same time, as things stand, from 
an international regulatory perspective, any measure linking to ratings would have a 
different bearing in developed than in developing countries. On the part of LDCs, it 
would be desirable to device incentives for GCRAs to improve on this situation. The 
International Financial Institutions might also be keen to participate in this process of 
upgrading the quality of private ratings across the world. Finally, mechanisms of firm 
credit enhancement guaranteed by a credit bureau or by multinational institutions such as 
the MIGA could prove extremely beneficial toward improving private ratings and 
reducing the cost of capital in LDCs. 
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Table 1: Corporate Rating Criteria 
 
Business Risk (Qualitative Rating Criteria)  Financial Risk (Quantitative Rating Criteria) 
Growth Prospects:  
•  Industry sector and trend 
•  Technology change in the sector 
•  Company’s stand in the sector and peer 
comparison 
•  Management quality 
 
Cash Flow Adequacy: 
•  Interest rate coverage ratios: EBIT and 
EBITDA interest coverage ratio 
•  Funds flow as a share of total debt 
•  Free operating cash flow as a share of total debt 
Capital Requirements: 
•  Fixed or working capital intensive  
•  Need for capital additions 
•  R&D spending requirements 
 
Capital Structure/Assets protection: 
•  Leverage (total and net debt as a share of equity 
and total capital) 
•  Debt structure, including assessments of lease, 
off-balance sheet obligations 
 
Competitive Environment:  
•  Nature of product (commodity or 
differentiated) 
•  Competitors (domestic and foreign) 
•  Barriers to entry 
•  Access to basic inputs of production 
•  Regulatory environment 
 
Profitability: 
•  Specific financial targets: Return on equity, 
return on assets, return on permanent capital. 
•  Historical, current, and projected performance 
•  Performance through the business cycles 
•  Earnings volatility 
Diversification and Ownership Structure: 
•  Ability to manage diversification 
•  Strength of linkage to parent company 
including financial, management, operational, 
R&D and technical support, position in the 
group, and relative size. 
 
Financial Flexibility: 
•  Considerations related to legal problems, 
insurance coverage, restrictive covenants in 
loan agreements, or obligations to affiliated 
entities. 





Table 2: Adjusted Key Industrial Financial Ratios, Long-term Debt 
 
Three-year (1997-1999) medians  AAA  AA  A  BBB  BB  B  CCC 
EBIT int. coverage ratio (x)  17.5   10.8  6.8  3.9  2.3  1.0  0.2 
EBITDA int. coverage ratio (x)  21.8   14.6  9.6  6.1  3.8  2.0  1.4 
Fund flows % total debt  105.8  55.8  46.1   30.5  19.2   9.4  5.8 
Free Oper. Cash flow/total debt (%)  55.4   24.6  15.6   6.6  1.9  -4.5  -14.0 
Return on Capital (%)  28.2   22.9  19.9   14.0  11.7   7.2  0.5 
Operating income % sales  29.2   21.3  18.3   15.3  15.4   11.2  13.6 
Long-term debt/total capital (%)  15.2   26.4  32.5   41.0  55.8   70.7  80.3 
Total debt % Capital 
 
26.9   35.6  40.1   47.4  61.3   74.3  89.4 
Companies 
 
10  34  150  234  276  240  23 
Source: Research: Adjusted Key US Industrial Financial Ratios, S&P, 07-Sep-2000.   19
 
Table 3: Distribution of Firms by Country (3-Year Average Data)









Czech Republic 1 0.2
Denmark 1 0.2
















Netherlands/Netherland Antilles 13 2.3









South Africa 1 0.2








Total  563 100
Memorandum:
 Firms from Developing Countries 135 24.8  20
Table 4: Median Value of Credit Ratings and 3-Year Average Financial Indicators 
(All Countries Including Both OECD and Non-OECD Countries) 
Rating  AAA  AA  A  BBB  BB  B  CCC & 
below 
EBIT int. cov. (x)  11.65  10.6  5.8  3.6  2.2  1.2  0.9 
EBITDA int. cov. (x)  17.1  18.2  9.35  6.3  3.6  2.4  1.4 
Return on Capital (%)  17.5  12.5  11.85  8.5  9.0  2.95  2.3 
Oper. Inc. % Sales  19.15  15.35  16.7  15.9  16.55  12.4  9.5 
Total Debt % Cap.  22.2  27  34.9  43  51.95  70.4  78 
Sales (mil. $)  33,385.5  7,154.2  5,111.3  2,091.7  978.2  458.0  423.9 
Equity (mil. $)  24,930.2  4,604.1  2,959.9  1,283.2  520.8  223.7  178.7 
Total Assets (mil. $)  43,995.5  9,659.4  6,054.7  3,000.2  1,660.1  946.5  781.5 
No. of Firms  4  40  101  181  108  87  26 
Note: Numbers are median values of 3-year financial averages (1997-99).  





Table 5: Median Value of Credit Ratings and 3-Year Averaged Financial Indicators 
(Non-OECD Developing Countries Only) 
Rating  AAA  AA  A  BBB  BB  B  CCC & 
below 
EBIT int. cov. (x)  n.a.  n.a.  n.a  3.05  2.0  1.2  1.0 
EBITDA int. cov. (x)  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  6.0  2.9  2.0  1.4 
Return on Capital (%)  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  10.9  11.1  6.4  2.15 
Oper. Inc. % Sales  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  33.8  20.3  17.7  12.45 
Total Debt % Cap.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  41  47.75  56.9  70.8 
Sales (mil. $)  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  1,547.5  921.7  409.4  246.9 
Equity (mil. $)  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  2,263.9  593.9  289.7  200.4 
Total Assets (mil. $)  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  4,673.3  1,568.9  823.4  781.5 
No. of Firms  0  0  0  35  37  34  20 
Note: Numbers are median values of 3-year financial averages (1997-99).  
Data Source: Standard & Poor’s. 
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Usable Observations 511 508
Adj. R
2 0.393 0.442
Note:     
      * indicates 99-100% significance level
    ** indicates 95-99% significance level
  *** indicates 90-95% significance level
Legend: 
    AVGFRAT : Average Firm Rating
    EBITINT : Intereset Coverage Before Income Taxes
    ROC : Rate of Return on Capital
    OPERINC : Operating Income Margin
    DEBTRATIO : Debt Ration
    TOTASSETS : Total Assets
    GOVTOWNER : Government Ownership Dummy
    SUBSIDY : Subsidiary Dummy
    AUTO : Auto Industry Dummy
    FOREST : Paper and Forest Industry Dummy
    HOME : Home Building Industry Dummy
    MEDIA : Media Industry Dummy




TABLE 7: Contribution of Firm and Sovereign Risk in Firm Ratings (Dependent Variable is LOG[AVGFRAT])
Variables IA IB IC IIA IIB IIC IIIA IIIB IIIC
CONSTANT -0.461 -0.667 -1.985 -0.461 -0.667 -1.985 0.329 -0.738 -2.050
(-1.27) (-2.76)* (-7.91)* (-0.89) (-1.37) (-6.40)* (0.19) (-0.96) (-3.36)*
LOG[AVGFRAT1] 1.273 1.008 1.085 1.273 1.008 1.085 1.307 1.186 1.000
(20.95)* (19.67)* (19.38)* (17.11)* (8.06)* (14.95)* (6.02)* (8.69)* (8.54)*
LOG[AVGSRAT] -0.137 0.142 0.362 -0.137 0.142 0.362 -0.339 0.000 0.450
(-1.45) (2.52)** (10.56)* (-1.06) (1.73)*** (10.13)* (-0.63) (9.77) (6.97)*
LOG[NONOECDFRAT1] -0.779 - - -0.779 - - -1.125 - -
(-8.91)* (-5.60)* (-2.56)*
LOG[NONOECDSRAT] 0.720 - - 0.720 - - 1.028 - -
(8.99)* (5.44)* (2.72)*
LOG[NONOECDFRAT1A] - -0.636 - - -0.636 - - -1.991 -
(-3.94)* (-4.72)* (-1.85)***
LOG[NONOECDSRAT1A] - 0.625 - - 0.625 - - 2.034 -
(3.70)* (4.60)* (1.75)***
LOG[NONOECDFRAT1B] - - -0.527 - - -0.527 - - -0.790
(-4.73)* (-2.00)** (-0.82)
LOG[NONOECDSRAT1B] - - 0.539 - - 0.539 - - 0.800
(5.02)* (2.09)** -0.88
Usable Observations 506 506 506 506 506 506 503 503 503
R Bar **2 0.605 0.563 0.570 0.605 0.563 0.570 0.584 0.502 0.547
Note:   I: Ordinary Least Square Legend: AVGFRAT : Average firm rating
            II: OLS Adjusted for Heteroscedasticity AVGFRAT1 : Estimated firm rating using firm financial indicators.
           III: 2SLS Using Instrumental Variables AVGSRAT : Average sovereign rating
              * indicates 99-100% significance level NONOECDFRAT1 : Estimated firm rating for developing countries
            ** indicates 95-99% significance level NONOECDSRAT : Sovereign rating for developing countries
          *** indicates 90-95% significance level NONOECDFRAT1A : Estimated firm ratings which are higher than their sovereign rating.
NONOECDSRAT1A : Sovereign ratings for those firms whose estimated ratings are higher than their sovereign rating.
NONOECDFRAT1B : Estimated firm ratings which are lower than their sovereign rating. 
NONOECDSRAT1B : Sovereign ratings for those firms whose estimated ratings are lower than their sovereign rating.
TABLE 8: Explaining the Rating Pattern
Variables IA IB IIA IIB
(Dep. Var. is STDEVACT) (Dep. Var. is STDEVACT)  (Dep. Var. is STDEVSOVRAT ) (Dep. Var. is STDEVSOVRAT)
CONSTANT 13.561 9.054 0.180 0.145
(6.00)* (3.55)* (7.52)* (5.33)*
LAW 1.455 - 0.010 -
(5.07)* (3.33)*
NONOECDLAW -3.266 - -0.027 -
(-8.50)* (-6.74)*
INFORQ - 2.216 - 0.016
(6.34)* (4.21)*
NONOECDINF - -2.996 - -0.025
(-7.82)* (-6.12)*
Usable Observations 552 548 552 548
R Bar **2 0.302 0.330 0.193 0.208
Note:
         * indicates 99-100% significance level
      ** indicates 95-99% significance level
    *** indicates 90-95% significance level
Legend:
    LAW : Rule of Law Index by Transparency International
    NONOECDLAW : Rule of Law Index for Developing Countries
    INFORQ : Financial Sector Information Quality by Chan-Lee and Ahn (2001)
    NONOECDINF : Financial Sector Information Quality for Developing Countries